Generalized trust varies across individuals and countries. Past studies on trust have demonstrated that voluntary association membership, inequality and ethnic homogeneity at country level are important. However, those studies examined either individual-level or country-level factors separately. In this paper, we conceptualized the emergence of generalized trust as a multilevel process in which the effects of individual-level attributes are influenced by social contexts. Using a multilevel modeling approach on World Values Survey in 48 countries, we estimated a cross-level interaction between voluntary association membership at individual level and income inequality and ethnic homogeneity as two types of social cleavages at country level. We found that the positive effect of voluntary association membership decreases with the level of income inequality.
Introduction
Generalized trust is a tendency or "belief in the benevolence of human nature in general" (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994) . Generalized trust is a special type of trust in others of whom we have no direct, personal experience (Paxton 2007) . Trust has been shown to be correlated with several aspects of well-being at the individual, organizational and country level. At the individual level, trust has been shown to contribute to educational achievement, economic success (Coleman 1990 ) and health (Kim, Subramanian and Kawachi 2006; Subramanian, Kim and Kawachi 2002; Suzuki et al. 2010; Veenstra 2000 ). Organizations with a high level of trust enjoy efficiency and outperform competitors by reducing internal and external transaction costs (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Sako 1992; Uzzi 1996 ). Countries with a high level of trust among their citizens benefit from efficient local governments, democracy (Paxton 2002; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 1999 ), economic growth (Tolbert, Lyson and Irwin 1998) and health (Subramanian, Kawachi and Kennedy 2001) .
Despite the universal appeal of trust, countries vary substantially in their level of generalized trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . According to the World Values Survey (WVS; 2009), between 1999 and 2001 nearly 70% of the respondents in Sweden and Finland demonstrated trust, whereas in Peru, Romania or Turkey the figure was around 10% or less. 1 This is not simply the result of economic development, considering a higher level of trust in India (41.20%) compared with the United States (36.51%) or Great Britain (32.84%). Such country-level variation in trust suggests that trust might be related to broader social and cultural characteristics. As countries vary in their aggregate level of generalized trust, individuals vary in their degree of trust within each society (Brehm and Rahn 1997) .
What explains variation in generalized trust at both individual and country levels? A number of studies across disciplines have investigated the determinants of generalized trust at each level (Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Paxton 2007; Rothstein 2001; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . In studies of the individual-level factors, education, age and income have been shown to be positively associated with trust (Subramanian, Jones and Duncan 2003; Veenstra 2000) . Country-level factors affecting trust have included income inequality, ethnic homogeneity, democracy and the proportion of Protestants (Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Bjørnskov 2007 ). Among these, income inequality and ethnic homogeneity have consistently been shown to be important.
Despite a large number of studies on determinants of trust, few studies have sought to explain how individual-level and country-level factors interact to produce generalized trust. Theoretical studies of trust indicate that the emergence of generalized trust is a multilevel process in which individual attributes, organizational resources and institutional conditions interact with one another (Fukuyama 1996; Gambetta 1988; Putnam 1993 ). This micro-macro link is crucial in several ways. First, it provides a theoretical interpretation of why certain individual attributes of trust (e.g., voluntary association membership) have shown inconsistent results across studies (Brehm and Rahn 1977; Delhey and Newton 2005; Paxton 2007 ). Second, it allows us to understand how individuals come to trust strangers in a multilevel process in which the attributes of individuals influence the level of trust, while certain social conditions mediate the effect of such attributes. A micro-macro link is thus a distinctive part of sociological insights on trust (Coleman 1990 ). However, as other disciplines have joined the study of trust, this link has been pushed to the background in favor of either a micro or macro approach. 2 Thus, a key goal of this paper is to integrate previously separated arguments of individual-level and country-level factors on generalized trust and to expand a theory of trust. We start from the argument that the production of generalized trust is a process in which individuals expand their boundary of trust by going beyond their familiar realms of social interaction. Thus, at the individual level, voluntary association membership is crucial because it brings individuals into connection with others. On the other hand, at a country level, the degree of social cleavage shapes the extent to which different groups interact with one another. Based on the previous studies, we focus on income inequality and ethnic homogeneity as two types of social cleavage (Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Bjørnskov 2007) . At a country level, we posit, both types of social cleavage shape the extent to which individuals potentially interact with others beyond the narrow boundary of their own groups. Importantly, we will examine a cross-level interaction between voluntary association membership and two types of social cleavage in which the effect of voluntary association membership on trust varies along with different degrees of social cleavage across societies.
To show such a cross-level interaction model, we will take advantage of a multilevel analysis, as this overcomes the restrictions of single-level modeling at either an individual or a country level (Subramanian 2004; Subramanian et al. 2009 ). In the conclusion, we will discuss how a multilevel approach offers a future research on a theory of generalized trust.
Voluntary Association Membership and Generalized Trust
Generalized trust is difficult to develop because it involves trusting someone in the absence of personal information or experience. Among individual attributes, voluntary association membership has been a key factor in developing generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Paxton 2007; Putnam 1993 Putnam , 2000 . Voluntary association membership promotes members' generalized trust by means of norms, social networks and sanctions. First, as members are socialized into accepting the common goal of their organization, they learn to adopt the norm of trusting other members (Foddy, Platow and Yamagishi 2009 ). Second, members develop social networks among themselves. Such social networks enhance monitoring and sanctioning capacities between individuals, thus constraining opportunistic behavior and promoting trustworthy behavior for a good reputation. Finally, voluntary association activities expand the boundary of trust beyond an individual's close circle of personal relationships by bringing about interactions with a socially diverse group of others. Yamagishi and Yamagishi's (1994) emancipatory theory of trust shows that an individualistic culture, as opposed to a collectivist culture, emancipates individuals to trust others beyond close personal relationships.
In the present paper, in addition to this cultural factor, we emphasize the "emancipatory effect" of voluntary association membership, which enhances an individual's level of generalized trust through meeting other members with whom he or she has no direction relationship. 3 In short, voluntary association membership is an organizational channel by which individuals expand their trust of strangers.
Social Cleavages and Generalized Trust
The social homogeneity of a group enhances the degree of sociocultural identity shared with other members, which increases the tendency to pursue a collective interest at the expense of short-term private interests and consequently enhances the level of generalized trust (Durkheim 1933; Coleman 1990) .
Social identity and the group-based theory of trust in social psychology also explains that people trust strangers when they identify or classify others as part of in-group members, thus, "depersonalizing" their unique individual characteristics (Turner 1985; Foddy, Platow and Yamagishi 2009 ). We suggest that social homogeneity facilitates individuals' tendency to depersonalize others and identify them as part of the ingroup, thus increasing the overall level of generalized trust. Consequently, individuals in a highly homogeneous society are likely to trust strangers of whom they have had no personal experience. On the other hand, those in society with a high degree of fragmentation are likely to restrict their trust to their circles of acquaintance, creating personal trust instead of generalized trust.
If homogeneity is a social condition of trust, then what types of homogeneity would matter? Earlier studies suggest that two attributes of societies that are particularly important: economic inequality and ethnic homogeneity (Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2002; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Zak and Knack 2001) . The more equal and the more ethnically homogeneous a society, the more its citizens are likely to trust strangers. 4 Why would economic and sociocultural cleavages be important as social conditions for generalized trust? We claim that inequality and ethnic homogeneity are the main types of social cleavages: the former economic and the latter cultural. We argue that economic inequality and ethnic fragmentation (the opposite of ethnic homogeneity) reduce a social boundary of sharing values and identities. The more economically unequal and the more fragmented ethnically a society is, the more a social boundary of sharing values and identities will be narrowed down to each economic or ethnic group. Therefore, when individuals live in a highly fragmented society, they are likely to restrict trust to those within their own groups, lowering the overall level of generalized trust.
A Micro-Macro Link of Generalized Trust
Individualistic and ecological fallacies are key parts of the discussion in sociological literature. Earlier studies of generalized trust, however, risk the danger of either type of fallacy by relying on either an individual-level or country-level unit of analysis. Paxton (2007) examined both individual-level and country-level determinants in a multilevel analysis and found that voluntary association membership at both individual and country levels increase the level of trust. However, despite findings of the effect of inequality on trust (Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) , Paxton found that income inequality did not affect the level of trust. We argue that such inconsistency in findings across studies resulted from ignoring a possible interaction between individual-level and country-level determinants of trust.
In the present study, we examined separate effects of both individual-level and country-level factors, but we also estimated a cross-level interaction as a compositional-contextual link by which societal characteristics provide conditions for the effect of individual attributes to produce trust. If this link is crucial in generalized trust, we would observe that voluntary association membership at an individual level affects trust to a different degree across societies with varying levels of social cleavages.
Why would we observe a cross-level interaction between associational activities and social cleavages on trust? We argue that voluntary association membership promotes trust by enabling individuals to interact with others from different social realms or social foci (Feld 1981) . However, this bridging effect is constrained by the degree of social cleavage. In a society with a strong social cleavage based on income or ethnic categories, voluntary associations are likely to have relatively homogeneous membership in terms of income or ethnic type. Thus, the bridging effect of voluntary association membership would be diminished since individuals would encounter others with similar social backgrounds. In short, we argue that the effect of voluntary association membership on individual trust is contingent upon two types of social cleavage: income inequality and ethnic homogeneity. Thus, we examined the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for other individual and societal variables, there will be a negative interaction between voluntary association membership and income inequality on an individual's level of trust in a society.
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for other individual and societal variables, there will be a positive interaction between voluntary association membership and ethnic homogeneity on an individual's level of trust in a society.
Data and Methods
We used WVS (2009) data in the present study. The WVS is ideal for examining both individual and social factors of generalized trust as it provides standardized survey questions on trust and other individual attitudes as well as individual attributes such as income, education, occupational status and gender across a wide range of countries. The WVS is an ongoing survey that started in 1981. Previous studies (Paxton 2007 ) relied on Wave 3, which covers years between 1994 and 1999. We used the WVS data of Wave 4, which cover the years between 1999 and 2001, depending on the year of survey in each country. More recent data were used mainly to expand the number of countries and, consequently, to examine more diverse societies. Among the countries surveyed, we included 40,484 individuals, from 48 countries, all of whom answered survey questions on generalized trust and voluntary association membership. 5
Individual-Level Dependent Variable
Following earlier studies on generalized trust, we measured the dependent variable, trust, using the question: "Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with others?" Responses were coded 1 for trust and 0 otherwise. Previous studies have reported a high degree of reliability and a high degree of correlation with a trusting attitude and trusting behaviors (Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2005; Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe 1998). 6 tend to stay within their own associations. To make a distinction between these two types, Paxton (2002) examined each association in terms of the proportion of the members who also have membership in other associations. Then, she classified each association as either connected or isolated, using a cutoff point of the proportion of overlapping membership between each association. Next, she created two dummy variables for the connected and isolated membership, respectively, if an individual belonged to each type of association.
We argue that the dummy variables are too simplistic because individuals have a value of 1 for either connected or isolated membership if they belong to at least one connected or isolated association. 7 Paxton's continuous measure provided an alternative by considering the degree of overlapping membership of associations. By averaging all the association scores of an individual, she sought to measure a typical degree of organizational overlapping. However, this approach can be problematic in two ways; first, because such measure would not capture overall activities of an individual. For example, two individuals may have a score of .7 by belonging to either two associations or seven associations as long as the average scores of connectedness would be .7 for both individuals. Second, if the degree of overlapping varies substantially between associations, then the average score would be affected by extreme scores.
As an alternative, we used a continuous variable of "connected" by capturing not only the degree of overlapping membership but also the level of an individual's organizational activities. For this, we created a connectedness variable that sums all the scores of overlapping membership measure of the associations to which an individual belongs, instead of averaging the scores across associations. For example, if an individual belongs to three associations whose overlapping membership measures are .5, .3 and .7, respectively, her measure of the connectedness would be (1 × .5) + (1 × .3) + (1 × .7) = 1.5. Such a measure would capture both the level of the individual's efforts and the organizational connectedness to reach socially diverse groups by such activities.
Other individual-level variables we included were age, gender (female as a reference category), marital status (unmarried as a reference category), educational level from 1 to 8, income from 1 to 10 and employment (unemployed as a reference category). For occupational prestige, we followed Paxton (2007) and assigned numeric values to the occupation of the household's chief income earner based on Ganzeboom and Treiman's International Standard Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) . We assigned numeric values from 1 to 7 based on the index number, with 7 as the highest level of prestige. 8 Following Paxton, we also included religious upbringing at home as a dummy variable (no religious upbringing as a reference category) and extroversion as the degree of importance the respondent assigns to friends, ranging from 1 to 4.
Country-Level Independent Variables
The country-level variables included GINI, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, ethnic homogeneity and Protestant proportion. 9 We collected GINI data from the World Income Inequality Database (United Nations University-Wider 2008). We obtained ethnic homogeneity and the proportion of Protestants from the CIA World Factbook. Finally, we obtained the GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2010). We selected these variables based on their use in earlier studies of cross-country variations in trust (Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Uslaner and Brown 2005; Welch, Sikkink and Loveland 2007) .
Several studies have discussed economic development as the key consequence of the overall level of generalized trust (Tolbert, Lyson and Irwin 1998; Zak and Knack 2001) . Other studies examined how the contents of dominant cultural beliefs in a country influence trust level. In particular, based on Weber's analysis of Protestantism as a rationalized religion, they argued that the dominance of Protestantism would strengthen citizens' faith in equality, direct accountability to God and their rational way of thinking, which would increase trust (Delhey and Newton 2005; Welch, Sikkink and Loveland 2007) . Those studies found a positive effect for the proportion of Protestantism on trust.
Among the country-level variables, GDP per capita and Protestants were control variables. 10 Our focus was on the effect of GINI and ethnic homogeneity and their cross-level interaction with the level of connectedness at the individual level, controlling other variables mentioned above.
Analysis
Given the multilevel nature of the research question (Subramanian 2004; Subramanian et al. 2009 ) as well as the multilevel structure of the data, we specified a two-level structure of 40,484 individuals at level 1, nested within 48 countries at level 2. The response variable was a dichotomous measure of trust. The probability of trust (p) for individual i in country jwas modeled using a two-level binomial logistic model (Goldstein 2003) .
We first estimated a two-level logistic model assuming a binomial error distribution for the response, p ij , as logit( ) ij j π β = 0 (Model 1), where p ij is the underlying propensity for generalized trust for individual i in country j; what is being modeled is the log-odds of p ij .
The parameter β 0 j represents the log-odds of generalized trust for individuals in country j. In Model 2, we estimated a two-level logistic model assuming a binomial error distribution for the response, p ij , as logit(
( ( , where p ij is the underlying propensity for generalized trust for individual i in country j. The parameter β 0 represents the log-odds of trust for the reference category, while B associated with X ij represents the vector of regression coefficients associated with a vector of covariates estimating the change in log-odds in trust for a unit change in the covariates and β(C ) ij represents the differential log-odds of reported trust for individuals with a different level of connectivity. The country random effects (u j 0 ) are assumed to be normally distributed with variance (σ u0 2 ), quantifying the between-country variation in the log-odds of reporting, conditional on the fixed part of the model (i.e., covariates and connected). We extend this model to allow the effect of connected to vary across countries, yielding the following model:
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Assuming a joint multivariate normal distribution, the random effects will have a variance-covariance structure:
This model provides a test of whether the country variation is different for connected and unconnected individuals, such that σ u0 2 estimates the between-country variation in the log-odds of trust for unconnected individuals, while the betweencountry variation in the log-odds of trust for connected individuals will be given as σ σ σ Bullen, Jones and Duncan 1997; Subramanian, Jones and Duncan 2003) . This model also tests the extent to which the association trust and connected varies across countries.
We then extend Model 2 to include country-level attributes, as
The new term B X j ( ) represents the vector of coefficients and variables measured at the country level, which include inequality (GINI), GDP per capita, ethnic homogeneity and Protestant proportion. Finally, we also tested for cross-level interaction between connectedness at the individual level and GINI at the country level.
The above-mentioned models were fitted using the MLwiN 2.1 software with Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation (Browne 2004; Jackman 2000) . The Bayesian estimation procedure was used. Because estimates of random effects in binomial models using maximum likelihood procedures tend to be biased (Rodriguez and Goldman 1995) . We used the deviance information criterion (DIC) coefficient, which is a by-product of the MCMC procedure (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002; van der Linde 2005) to compare the relative fit of the different models with the data. The DIC statistic is a combination of the fit to the data and to the complexity. As the DIC statistic accounts for the number of parameters in any model, a larger DIC suggests worse performance. A small difference in DIC between models indicates that they are empirically equivalent (Burnham and Anderson 2002) .
Here, we used the MLwiN 2.1 software to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the starting values of the distribution, with 500 simulations as a discarded burn-in followed by 50,000 additional simulations to obtain the distribution of interest. We used default diffuse priors, meaning that we did not favor a priori any particular values of the estimates. The results are based on the mean of the simulated values and the standard error is the standard deviation of the simulated distribution.
Results
First, we present correlation matrices for both individual-level and country-level variables in Table 1 and Table 2 .
They show the types of relationships at both levels but none of the tables demonstrated any concerns related to multicollinearity. Table 3 contains the result of the nested models to test our key hypotheses. Model 1 is a random intercept model. It shows that individuals are less likely to have generalized trust, whereas countries vary significantly in their overall level of trust in the random part (country-level variance of .66 with .15 as a standard error).
Model 2 includes all individual-level variables in the fixed part. It demonstrates that age, education, income, employment, extrovert personality and voluntary association membership all are positively associated with trust. However, the association between trust and gender, marital status, occupational prestige and religious upbringing were not substantial. Among the individual factors, connection with others through voluntary association membership was particularly strong compared with other variables. This shows that, controlling for all other individual factors, meeting others in diverse social domains increases an individual's boundary of trust beyond a close circle of personal acquaintances. At the same time, after controlling for all key individual variables, the country-level variance in the random part continues to show substantial variation across countries. It decreased somewhat from the random intercept model (from .66 to .64), but remained substantially high. This suggests that generalized trust of individuals has strong social contextual components that do not disappear when considering only individual attributes. Model 3 has only statistically significant individual-level variables from the previous model, with essentially the same results but with a small increase in the effect of voluntary association membership.
Due to the evidence of strong country-level variation in trust, Model 4 includes our country-level-variables in addition to the key individual-level variables in the fixed part. The results are as expected: economic inequality (GINI) decreases trust, while economic development or national wealth, ethnic homogeneity and the proportion of Protestants all increase trust. In particular, economic inequality demonstrates a negative effect, even after controlling for the level of economic development. Thus, it is not simply the overall level of national wealth, but how equally such resources are distributed among individuals that influences an individual's tendency to trust strangers.
We argue that such an effect of inequality comes from the type of cleavage and the distance economic class puts between individuals. By the same logic, the positive effect of ethnic homogeneity (the opposite of ethnic fractionalization) demonstrates that the more individuals are similar to one another socioculturally, the more likely .00
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. The figure shows that, all other variables being controlled for, as the degree of connectedness of an individual through voluntary association membership increases, the level of trust increases. However, the effect of connectedness is stronger as the level of economic inequality decreases. In fact, when a society is highly unequal, the effect of voluntary association membership is minimal. As the level of economic equality increases, individuals in those societies increase their level of generalized trust by joining civic organizations with diverse membership. Based on this strong contextual of effects of inequality on the effect of voluntary association membership, we can understand why previous studies with either micro-or macro-level analysis reported contradictory results pertaining to the effect of voluntary association membership.
However, Model 7 shows that Hypothesis 2 is rejected. Voluntary association membership does not show any statistically significant interaction with ethnic homogeneity. Thus, ethnic homogeneity or sociocultural cleavage influences the overall level of trust in societies as a main effect. It does not, however, provide a social context for the effect of civic engagement on trust.
Considering the results of Models 5, 6 and 7, we ran Model 8 as a final model. Model 8 includes both GINI and ethnic homogeneity and their interactions with voluntary association membership. GINI shows a stronger negative interaction effect with voluntary association membership, but ethnic homogeneity still fails to show a statistically significant interaction effect with voluntary association. Ethnic homogeneity, however, does demonstrate a statistically significant positive main effect on trust. Table 4 compares the overall goodness-of-fit of the models using the DIC coefficient, as explained above. Based on DIC and our theoretical focus on voluntary To summarize, our results show the following. First, generalized trust has both individual and social components. Age, education, income, jobs, outgoing personality and a religious upbringing help us to trust beyond our close circle of families and friends. Supporting Putnam's argument, voluntary association membership appears to matter strongly, particularly when these associations provide a forum for meeting others beyond one's usual social domains. Moreover, at the country level, economic inequality, economic development, ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism in each country influence the level of trust. Thus, the result supports the key findings of past studies regarding individual-level and country-level determinants of trust.
Second, the present study departs from the past studies in that there is significant cross-level interaction between the individual-level and country-level determinants of trust. In particular, voluntary association membership matters more in more economically equal societies. In other words, economic cleavages across income groups weaken the effect of civic engagement on trust. This implies a virtuous or vicious circle of trust: the more egalitarian a society is, the greater benefit it will receive from the level of civic engagement of its citizens, whereas the more unequal a society is, the less benefit it will receive from the level of civic engagement.
Robustness Checks
We showed that the level of generalized trust of individuals is affected by the level of voluntary association activities that cut across diverse social groups, which, in turn, is affected by the degree of social cleavages across income groups. Would it be possible that such generalized trust is also affected by the level of trust in the government or social security programs at an individual level? Would we still observe the effect of voluntary association activities and its contingency with economic inequality, after controlling for these two types of trust? The following table shows two additional models with each type of trust as an additional control variable. Both models used the same WVS survey data that include questions on the level of trust in the government and social security programs.
The table demonstrates that, controlling for the level of trust in the government and in the social security programs, our hypothesis for the effect of voluntary association activities and its cross-level interaction with income inequality is still supported. Thus, although institutional trust in the government and social protection may vary across individuals and countries, joining voluntary associations and social cleavages affects generalized trust, independent of institutional trust. 12 Another issue to consider is the measure of voluntary association activities. Our key variable, the level of connectedness or the level of voluntary association activities, captures the level of such activities weighted by the level of overlapping membership between associations. In short, the more associations an individual joins and the more connected those associations are with others in terms of membership, the more connected that individual will be according to the measure.
The level of connectedness captures the level of an individual's connectedness as a continuous measure, but it is possible that a simple measure of the overall number of associations an individual joins captures connectedness more directly. In addition, voluntary associations may be qualitatively distinguished between connected versus isolated types, which would show a different level of effects on generalized trust in the individuals who join them. If we conjecture that the distinction of the types matters, it is worth examining the effects of the connected type and the isolated type separately.
To examine the effects of such different measures of individual connectedness through voluntary association membership, we ran additional models with the same variables in each case but with individual measures of connectedness. The result, which can be provided upon a request, shows that the relationship between all the other variables in our main result remained the same. In the following table, we selectively show the effect of our original measure of connectedness in Model 8 and those of other measures in subsequent models. Model 11 includes the measure of the overall number of associations an individual joins. This indicates that the sheer volume of associational activities affects generalized trust positively. However, this effect is weaker than our original measure of connectedness in Model 8, which considers the nature of the associations. In terms of cross-level interaction with connectedness and GINI, Model 10 repeats the negative interaction of Model 8, our best model: the more equal a society is, the stronger the effect of the total number of associations on generalized trust is. Model 8 also demonstrates a slightly better fit for the data than Model 10 in terms of DIC.
Both Model 12 and Model 13 use different measures for the isolated type (i.e., sports or recreational, religious and trade unions) and the connected type (all of the other associations). The difference is that Model 12 uses the total number of each type, whereas Model 13 uses the percentage of the connected type of the total number of associations an individual joins and that of the isolated type of total number of associations an individual joins. Thus, the measures in Model 13 seek to capture how dominant each type of association is in an individual's portfolio of associational activities. To put it simply, if an individual joins only the connected type, his or her score is 100% for the percentage of the connected type, whereas if an individual joins only the isolated type, his or her score is 100% for the percentage of the isolated type. Note: SE=standard deviation; coef=coefficient.
SE
Model 12 reveals that the connected type and the isolated type increase the level of generalized trust positively. As in Paxton's study, we also observed that the connected type has a stronger effect than the isolated type. Therefore, it is not simply the volume of associational activities, but which association an individual joins that matters for generalized trust. The interactions for each type demonstrated negative directions, as in the previous models. Unlike Model 12, Model 13 does not show a statistically significant effect for each type. The result suggests that a relative share of either the connected or isolated type in an individual's portfolio of associations does not critically affect their generalized trust of individuals. In other words, whether an individual joins exclusively the connected type or the isolated type does not directly determine their level of generalized trust. Only when such measures are combined with the overall level of associational activities, as in Model 8 or Model 12, does the distinction among voluntary associations matter. To summarize, based on the comparison of DIC in the above table, our original measure of connectedness appears to explain our multilevel data better than the alternative measures.
Conclusion and Discussion
The key goal of our paper was to examine how voluntary association membership at individual level would interact with two types of social cleavages, income inequality and ethnic homogeneity, on generalized trust in individuals. We posited the existence of a compositional-contextual link in which country-level variables such as economic inequality provide a social context for the effect of individual variables on generalized trust. To put it another way, individual factors are socially embedded in social contexts to produce generalized trust.
Our results demonstrate that, among individual attributes, age, education, income, employment and outgoing personality increase the level of generalized trust. More importantly, participating in voluntary associations increases the level of generalized trust more than any other individual characteristic. Among the country-level variables, economic development and the proportion of Protestants increase the level of trust on average. As reported in previous studies, economic inequality decreases trust, whereas ethnic homogeneity increases trust on average. Hence, when examining both individual-level and country-level variables as the main effects, our results support previous studies. For the cross-level interaction between voluntary association membership and two societal variables, economic inequality and ethnic homogeneity, we did find that the effect of voluntary association membership varies with the level of economic inequality: the more equal a society is, the stronger the positive outcome on trust the level of voluntary association membership has.
Therefore, we found that economic cleavage, measured by GINI, matters both as a main effect at a societal level and as a social context for the effect of civic participation at an individual level. This is the finding that sets our study apart from previous studies. We claim that such a micro-macro link between voluntary association membership and economic inequality can explain why several studies presented inconsistent results for either variable. Our study reveals that the same level of voluntary association Voluntary Association Membership and Social Cleavages • 1199 activities can produce different levels of generalized trust across societies with different degrees of economic fragmentation or cleavage. Therefore, we may or may not find a positive effect of voluntary association membership on trust, depending on the countries we choose to study. If we examine those countries that are highly unequal, we would find that the level of voluntary association membership does not matter for trust in such countries. In other words, when a society experiences a high level of income inequality, social distances between economic groups are so wide that even members of a voluntary associations would be divided along economic lines, thus nullifying connecting effect of group activities.
On the other hand, we did not find a cross-level interaction between ethnic homogeneity and trust. However, ethnic homogeneity remains important as a country-level variable. The fact that ethnic homogeneity does not influence the effect of voluntary association membership on trust suggests that the two variables work at different dimensions. The way we conceptualize voluntary association membership is that it would offer individuals a chance to meet other individuals from diverse social realms, thus broadening the boundary of his or her usual knowledge and comfort zones as regards other social groups. However, individuals join voluntary associations locally. On the other hand, ethnic homogeneity, when measured at the country level, does not capture the degree of sociocultural cleavage at the local level. Instead, it captures the overall or national-level fragmentation of sociocultural groups. Therefore, it offers the general social condition for the overall level of trust in each country, but it cannot channel the effect of voluntary association activities at the local level. In short, ethnic fragmentation as a type of sociocultural cleavage can be an important social context for the effect of voluntary association participation, but it works at a more local level than at a country level. In a future study, we can measure ethnic homogeneity at a local level, such as at the state or city level, as a higher level while measuring trust at an individual level as a lower level of analysis. In this type of case, we would expect to find cross-level interaction between ethnic homogeneity and voluntary association membership.
Generalized trust is universally accepted as beneficial for individuals, groups and societies. However, the present study shows that it varies substantially across all of those units. Thus, past studies sought to understand the conditions of such variations through different units of analysis. They added important insight into how the socioeconomic attributes of individuals and the socioeconomic and political development of societies are critical for the growth of generalized trust in either individuals or countries. At the same time, previous efforts did not pay a critical attention to the micro-macro link between different levels of factors for the production of generalized trust. Our finding on civic engagement in the form of voluntary association participation, particularly through those associations with diverse membership, demonstrate that trust is not a fixed psychological attribute but can be produced through social interaction. This finding also supports previous literature regarding the effect of diverse social networks on trust. Future research in this area should investigate the extent to which diverse social ties can produce generalized trust versus private trust. Do individuals with socially diverse ties have either a high level of both public and private trust or a high level of public trust without a correspondingly high level of private trust?
While our study focuses on individual-level and country-level analysis, future studies should examine the group level as an additional social context for generalized trust. In such studies, would we find that the positive effects of voluntary association membership vary across social groups such as socioethnic groups? This would be particularly important for examining ethnic homogeneity as a social context for trust.
Notes
1. The median value of the proportion of those who trust others in all surveyed countries was 24.66%, with 15.44 as the standard deviation. Among the countries, 70.99% was the highest percentage and 7.04% was the lowest, indicating a substantial variation.
2. Unlike a majority of empirical studies on trust, Gheorghiu, Vignoles and Smith (2009) examined both individual-level and collective-level factors on trust and found that a cultural norm of independence and autonomy at a country level (as opposed to interdependence) promotes generalized trust. However, our study differs from Gheorghiu, Vignoles and Smith's research in several important ways. First, while their research examined the effect of cultural norms at a societal level, our key independent variables are voluntary association membership at individual level and income inequality at a country level, both of which received empirical support from previous studies but were missing in their study. More importantly, we examine a cross-level interaction between individual-level and collectivelevel factors, voluntary association membership and income inequality. 4. Reverse causality is often discussed on inequality and trust. It is not possible to show a conclusive causal direction between inequality and trust due to the cross-sectional data of the present study. However, a previous study of inequality and trust supported inequality as the determinant of trust, not the other way around (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) . At the same time, it is hard to find a clear logical link in which trust among individuals directly determine an overall level of inequality in a society.
5. The following countries were included in the present study: Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, the Russian Republic, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Great Britain, the United States, Viet Nam.
6. Miller and Mitamura (2003) argue that our measure of trust conflates two distinct dimensions of individuals' tendencies: trust and caution. We agree that such conflation can hinder comparing levels of trust across countries. However, our key goal was to demonstrate a cross-level interaction between individual-level and country-level factors
Voluntary Association Membership and Social Cleavages • 1201 on trust after controlling the main covariates from previous studies. Thus, it was necessary to use the current measure of trust from the WVS to compare our argument with previous studies. When future surveys ask questions on trust and caution separately, we would be able to compare determinants on trust and those on caution. Another point of Miller and Mitamura was that the level of caution would be influenced by public safety and ethnic homogeneity in a society. In our study, we did control economic development, which would influence level of public safety and ethnic homogeneity. Thus, we argue that the variations in the determinants of caution across countries were controlled and consequently the level of caution was partly controlled.
7. Paxton (2007) found that connected membership had a stronger effect than isolated membership. When we replicated her measures, we found positive effects of both types, but we did not find a stronger effect of the connected type compared to the isolated type.
8. We also used the original index numbers ranging from 10s to 80s, finding the same result.
9. We also tested the democracy score (Polity IV database), energy consumption, the share of agricultural employment, ex-communist history, the share of the population aged between 15 and 64 years, the share of the population with a secondary education, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, trade as a percentage of GDP, inflow foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP and urbanization, which we obtained from World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2010). However, we did not find a significant effect on trust when controlling for some of the country-level variables, particularly GDP per capita as a measure of economic development. Thus, we reported only the result with the key country-level variables.
10. Gheorghiu, Vignoles and Smith's study (2009) used a cultural level of independence as a key country-level variable. In our paper, we used the level of Protestant proportion as a country-level country variable. Inglehart and Baker (2000) showed that Protestant countries, in contrast to other religions, demonstrate a high level of independence. Thus, our country-level variable of the Protestant proportion can capture a similar effect of the culture of independence in Gheorghiu, Vignoles and Smith's study.
11. We recognize the reciprocal nature of the relationship between voluntary association activities and trust (Paxton 2007) . A number of studies have empirically tested the possibility of reverse causality from civic engagement to trust (Shah 1998; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997) . They found either weak or no effect of on civic engagement. You do not need generalized trust to participate in voluntary associations (Uslaner and Brown 2005 ). Individuals with a low level of generalized trust would still join voluntary associations, but they would join a narrow or less connected type of organization where they could find others who share their social background or particularized trust (Uslaner 2001; Wuthnow 1998) . To test reverse causality empirically, we ran a model with trust as the independent variable and voluntary association membership as the dependent variable. Although the effect of trust was statistically significant, it was very weak (the coefficient of .002).
